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PROTECTING PRISONERS DURING 
CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS: THE 
ROAD FORWARD AFTER HOWES v. FIELDS 
Michelle Parilo* 
Abstract: In 1966, in Miranda v. Arizona, the U.S. Supreme Court sought to 
mitigate the inherently coercive atmosphere of custodial interrogations to 
protect victims from involuntary self-incrimination. In analyzing custody 
for Miranda purposes, courts look at whether a reasonable person would 
feel that his freedom of movement had been restricted. When conducting 
this analysis for a prisoner questioned during incarceration, courts should 
thoroughly consider the negative psychological effects of prisons in order 
to understand the prisoner’s mindset. The Court had the opportunity to 
do so in Howes v. Fields, but it instead minimized the coercive effects of 
prisons. Moreover, the Court’s finding that the prisoner in Howes was not 
in Miranda custody is inconsistent with its past holdings. This Note argues 
that, in the future, courts should consider with greater nuance the nega-
tive effects of prisons in order to protect prisoners from making involun-
tary confessions. 
Introduction 
 On the night of December 23, 2001, officers took Randall Lee 
Fields from his jail cell; he did not know where he was being taken or 
for what purpose.1 He was serving a forty-five day sentence at the Le-
nawee County Sheriff’s Department for disorderly conduct.2 A jail 
guard and two sheriff’s deputies escorted Fields, dressed in his orange 
jumpsuit, from the jail to the sheriff’s department in the same build-
ing.3 The deputies ushered Fields down a flight of stairs and through a 
locked door that separated the jail and the sheriff’s department.4 The 
deputies then took Fields into a locked conference room in the admin-
istrative section of the jail and interrogated him about allegations of 
 
* Articles Editor, Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice (2012–2013). 
1 Fields v. Howes, 617 F.3d 813, 815 (6th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 1181 (2012). 
2 Id.; Brief for the Respondent at 1, Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181 (2012) (No. 10-
680). 
3 Brief for the Respondent, supra note 2, at 1–2. 
4 Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 1185–86 (2012); Brief for the Respondent, supra 
note 2, at 1. 
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sexual conduct that had occurred outside the prison.5 The deputies did 
not give Fields a Miranda warning, nor did they warn him that he was a 
suspect in their investigation.6 Fields believed that he was required to 
speak with the deputies, and was not told otherwise.7 In fact, Fields 
stated multiple times that he didn’t want to speak with the deputies any 
longer.8 The deputies subsequently extracted an incriminating state-
ment from Fields.9 
 Although Fields was not restrained during the interrogation, the 
deputies were armed.10 He was frightened during the interrogation 
when Deputy Batterson swore at him, commanding that he “sit [his] 
fucking ass down.”11 During the interview, Fields “became agitated and 
began to yell.”12 Despite being told he could return to his cell at any 
time, Fields did not feel that he had the freedom to leave.13 Deputy Bat-
terson admitted that Fields “could not have just gotten up and walked 
out of the room.”14 Moreover, an immediate return to his cell would 
not have been possible because he had to wait for the corrections offi-
cer to escort him, which would have taken approximately twenty min-
utes.15 Fields had never been in that part of the jail before and did not 
know how to get back to his cell.16 
 The interrogation began sometime between 7:00 p.m. and 9:00 
p.m.17 Although the standard bedtime for prisoners was 10:30 p.m., 
and although Fields was scheduled to wake up to take a dose of his 
medication at 5:00 a.m., he was not escorted back to his cell until 2:00 
                                                                                                                      
5 Fields, 617 F.3d at 815; Brief for the Respondent, supra note 2, at 1–2. The conference 
room door was opened and closed at various points during the interrogation. Howes, 132 S. 
Ct. at 1186. 
6 See Howes, 132 S. Ct. at 1186; Brief for the Respondent, supra note 2, at 2. In Miranda 
v. Arizona, the Supreme Court mandated that prior to custodial interrogation, “the person 
must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may 
be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, 
either retained or appointed.” 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). 
7 See Howes, 132 S. Ct. at 1186; Brief for the Respondent, supra note 2, at 2. 
8 Howes, 132 S. Ct. at 1186. 
9 Id.; Brief for the Respondent, supra note 2, at 1. 
10 Howes, 132 S. Ct. at 1186. 
11 Fields, 617 F.3d at 815; Brief for the Respondent, supra note 2, at 2. 
12 Howes, 132 S. Ct. at 1186. 
13 Id.; Brief for the Respondent, supra note 2, at 2. 
14 Brief for the Respondent, supra note 2, at 2–4. 
15 Howes, 132 S. Ct. at 1186. 
16 Brief for the Respondent, supra note 2, at 2. In fact, on his way back to his cell, 
Fields started walking down the wrong hallway. Id. 
17 Howes, 132 S. Ct. at 1186. Fields stated that he was escorted from his cell at 8:00 p.m. 
and that the interview started around 8:30 p.m. Id. at 1186 n.1. 
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a.m.18 Further, as a result of the interrogation, Fields did not receive his 
nightly dose of medication.19 Overall, the questioning lasted between 
five and seven hours.20 One of the deputies said the length of this in-
terrogation was not unusual, but that he had never participated in one 
of that length.21 
 After the officers obtained a confession from Fields, the interroga-
tion ended and he was returned to his cell.22 He confessed to engaging 
in sexual acts with a twelve-year-old boy.23 Fields was convicted of crimi-
nal sexual conduct and sentenced to a term of ten to fifteen years of 
imprisonment.24 
* * * * * 
 The facts of Howes v. Fields, are not uncommon; in many cases, the 
defendant prisoner is isolated from the general prison population, 
questioned about conduct occurring outside the prison, and induced 
into making inculpatory statements without receiving Miranda warn-
ings.25 These cases highlight an important law enforcement technique 
that was addressed in Miranda v. Arizona: the questioning of suspects in 
custody in order to obtain information and confessions.26 Miranda im-
posed procedural safeguards to protect the suspect’s privilege against 
self-incrimination in these situations.27 A person is considered “in cus-
                                                                                                                      
18 Brief for the Respondent, supra note 2, at 2–3. The Michigan Court of Appeals, 
however, stated that the interrogation ended around midnight. Howes, 132 S. Ct. at 1186 
n.2. Fields was on medication for his transplanted kidney and depression. Brief for the 
Respondent, supra note 2, at 3. 
19 Brief for the Respondent, supra note 2, at 3. 
20 Howes, 132 S. Ct. at 1186 n.2. Based on testimony from the deputies, the Court of 
Appeals reported that the interrogation lasted for seven hours. Id. Fields thought the in-
terrogation ended around 1:30 a.m. or 2:00 a.m., making the total number of hours five or 
five and a half. Id. 
21 Brief for the Respondent, supra note 2, at 4. 
22 Howes, 132 S. Ct. at 1186. 
23 Id. at 1185–86. 
24 Id. at 1186. 
25 See, e.g., id. at 1185–87; Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 2–5 (1968) (refusing to 
admit into evidence a confession of an inmate who was separated from the general prison 
population to be interrogated for filing false income taxes, a crime unrelated to the one 
for which he was incarcerated); United States v. Menzer, 29 F.3d 1223, 1225, 1232–33 (7th 
Cir. 1994) (admitting a confession of arson by an imprisoned defendant who was in prison 
for probation revocation and interrogated away from the general prison population); 
Leviston v. Black, 843 F.2d 302, 303–05 (8th Cir. 1988) (admitting a confession of robbery 
by defendant who was in jail on an unrelated charge and interrogated outside of the gen-
eral prison population). 
26 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478–79. 
27 Id. 
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tody” if the circumstances surrounding the interrogation would lead a 
reasonable person to feel his freedom was restrained to the “degree 
associated with a formal arrest.”28 Miranda requires that whenever a 
person is in custody, “[p]rior to any questioning, the person must be 
warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does 
make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to 
the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.”29 The 
Miranda Court articulated these procedural safeguards after balancing 
the value of interrogations to law enforcement and the need to protect 
individuals’ constitutional privilege against self-incrimination resulting 
from potential psychological ploys used by the police to create an in-
herently coercive environment.30 
 Miranda custody concerns are even more acute for individuals who 
are incarcerated.31 The prison environment itself can amount to the 
type of inherently coercive atmosphere that Miranda sought to avoid 
because of its isolating and degrading conditions.32 Prisons are dehu-
manizing primarily because they strip prisoners of their freedom and 
privacy.33 Prisoners live in a state of constant fear and paranoia, leading 
them to be antisocial and to sometimes turn against their fellow pris-
oners.34 Most researchers agree that living in a prison causes long-term 
psychological harm.35 Moreover, prison guards wield a cruel brand of 
authority over prisoners because they, too, have been hardened by the 
prison culture.36 
 When analyzing custody for Miranda purposes, courts should con-
sider the inherently negative sociological and psychological effects that 
                                                                                                                      
28 Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 
U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983)). 
29 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. 
30 See id. at 448–55, 481, 490–91. 
31 Trisha Chokshi, The Scope of Miranda Rights in Prison: When Is Someone in Custody “in 
Custody”?, 24 J. DuPage County B. Ass’n 22, 22 (2011). 
32 See Michel Foucault, Discipline & Punish 236–37 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage 
Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977); Craig Haney, The Psychological Impact of Incarceration: Implications 
for Postprison Adjustment, in Prisoners Once Removed: The Impact of Incarceration 
and Reentry on Children, Families, and Communities 33, 45 ( Jeremy Travis & Mi-
chelle Waul eds., 2003), available at http://www.prisonexp.org/pdf/haney.pdf. 
33 Philip Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn 
Evil 223 (2008). 
34 Id. at 24–25, 205; Haney, supra note 32, at 41. 
35 Haney, supra note 32, at 38. 
36 See Michael G. Santos, Inside: Life Behind Bars in America 52 (2006); Zim-
bardo, supra note 33, at 18–20. 
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result from incarceration.37 In Howes v. Fields, the Supreme Court had 
the opportunity to inquire into the lives of prisoners while conducting 
its “all of the circumstances” test for determining Miranda custody.38 
The Court, however, declined to do so, and instead chose to minimize 
the negative effects of prison.39 Moreover, the Court’s holding was in-
consistent with its past decisions regarding Miranda custody of interro-
gated prisoners.40 
 Part I of this Note follows the history of the Court’s protection of 
an individual’s privilege against self-incrimination, beginning with its 
peak in 1966 with the Miranda decision and ending with Miranda’s ero-
sion in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Part II dis-
cusses the inherent sociological and psychological pressures of incar-
ceration by exploring the experiences of prison guards and prisoners. 
Part III examines the Supreme Court’s holding in Howes, highlighting 
the Court’s failure to adequately consider the mindset of the prisoner. 
Part III argues that the Court’s finding that Fields was not in Miranda 
custody when he was interrogated is inconsistent with its past decisions 
about Miranda custody in the prison context. Finally, Part IV suggests 
that the Court should have closely examined the brutal atmosphere of 
prisons during its Miranda custody analysis in Howes, rather than mini-
mizing the negative effects of the coercive prison atmosphere and in-
correctly holding that Fields did not need to be given Miranda warn-
ings. Part IV also argues that the Court was correct in declining to find 
a per se rule for Miranda custody in the prison context; however, in the 
future, courts should consider the negative effects of prisons more 
closely when determining whether a reasonable prisoner would have 
felt free to terminate the interrogation. 
I. The Evolution of the Miranda Standard 
 The Warren Court’s holding in Miranda v. Arizona in 1966 was the 
peak of the criminal procedural revolution: rights of criminal suspects 
                                                                                                                      
37 See David C. Berg, Putting the Fifth Amendment Behind Bars: United States v. Morales, 
55 Brook. L. Rev. 455, 475 (1989); Maya Dominguez, “Custody” in Custody: Redefining 
Miranda Rights in Prison, 19 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 1305, 1306, 1314–16 (2011); 
Haney, supra note 32, at 38–43. 
38 See Howes, 132 S. Ct. at 1192–94. 
39 See id. at 1189–92; Berg, supra note 37, at 475; Dominguez, supra note 37, at 1306, 
1314–16; Haney, supra note 32, at 38–43. 
40 See Howes, 132 S. Ct. at 1187–89; Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1224–25 
(2010); Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 294–97 (1990); Mathis, 391 U.S. at 2–5. 
222 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 33:217 
expanded and the scope of constitutional police practices shrank.41 
Since that time, the scope of Miranda has been limited by the Burger 
and Rehnquist Courts’ narrow interpretations of the holding.42 As a 
result, suspects’ Fifth Amendment rights in the interrogation context 
have been limited as well.43 
A. Miranda v. Arizona: Taming the Coercive Atmosphere 
 In Miranda, the Warren Court held that the police must obey pro-
cedural safeguards whenever interrogating a suspect in custody.44 The 
Court’s holding reflected its belief that the police were resorting to psy-
chological and mental coercion during custodial interrogations.45 The 
police sought to interrogate a suspect in privacy to deprive the suspect 
of every “psychological advantage.”46 They sought to have the suspect 
isolated in unfamiliar surroundings for the interrogation in order to 
create an intimidating atmosphere.47 The Miranda Court read police 
manuals to understand the psychological ploys conducted by the police 
to extract confessions.48 In particular, the ploys utilized included “mini-
miz[ing] the moral seriousness of the offense” or “cast[ing] blame on 
                                                                                                                      
41 384 U.S. 436, 439, 444 (1966); Michael J. Roth, Note, Berkemer Revisited: Uncovering 
the Middle Ground Between Miranda and the New Terry, 77 Fordham L. Rev. 2779, 2786 
(2009). 
42 See, e.g., Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2264 (2010) (holding that in order 
to invoke his right to remain silent, a suspect must say that he chooses to remain silent); 
United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 633–34 (2004) (holding that when a suspect is not 
given his Miranda warnings, his statements are not allowed to be admitted, but physical 
evidence that is found as a result of the statements can be admitted); Davis v. United 
States, 512 U.S. 452, 454–55, 462 (1994) (holding that a suspect being interrogated must 
clearly request counsel, rather than simply reference it); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 
300–02, 308 (1985) (holding that Miranda was a prophylactic rule and therefore admitting 
the defendant’s second confession, even though he had already let the “cat out of the bag” 
with his first confession, which he gave before receiving his Miranda warnings); Oregon v. 
Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045–47 (1983) (holding that a suspect who initiated conversa-
tion with officials after the questioning had ceased could be subjected to further interroga-
tion); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 97–98, 104, 107 (1975) (holding that as long as the 
officials “scrupulously honored” a suspect’s right to silence by ceasing questioning on the 
relevant case after the suspect clearly invoked his right to silence, then other officials could 
question him about an unrelated crime two hours later). 
43 D. Christopher Dearborn, “You Have the Right to an Attorney,” but Not Right Now: Com-
bating Miranda’s Failure by Advancing the Point of Attachment Under Article XII of the Massachu-
setts Declaration of Rights, 44 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 359, 369 (2011). 
44 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 439, 444. 
45 Id. at 445–55. 
46 Id. at 449. 
47 Id. at 449–50, 457. 
48 Id. at 448–50. 
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the victim or on society.”49 The Court recognized that, while these tac-
tics did not amount to the “third degree,” such custodial interrogation 
still “exact[ed] a heavy toll on individual liberty” and was “equally de-
structive of human dignity.”50 The Court held that confessions obtained 
in such an atmosphere violated the Fifth Amendment prohibition 
against self-incrimination because they were not completely voluntary.51 
 In light of these findings, the Court implemented Miranda rights 
as a procedural safeguard to address the “inherently compelling pres-
                                                                                                                      
49 Id. The Court observed the following: 
From these representative samples of interrogation techniques, the setting 
prescribed by the manuals and observed in practice becomes clear. In es-
sence, it is this: To be alone with the subject is essential to prevent distraction 
and to deprive him of any outside support. The aura of confidence in his 
guilt undermines his will to resist. He merely confirms the preconceived story 
the police seek to have him describe. Patience and persistence, at times re-
lentless questioning, are employed. To obtain a confession, the interrogator 
must “patiently maneuver himself or his quarry into a position from which 
the desired objective may be attained.” When normal procedures fail to pro-
duce the needed result, the police may resort to deceptive stratagems such as 
giving false legal advice. It is important to keep the subject off balance, for 
example, by trading on his insecurity about himself or his surroundings. The 
police then persuade, trick, or cajole him out of exercising his constitutional 
rights. 
Id. at 455. 
50 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455, 457. The “third degree” was a police tactic using forms of 
cruelty and brutality to obtain involuntary confessions, which was highlighted by President 
Hoover’s Wickersham Commission. Amos N. Guiora, Relearning Lessons of History: Miranda 
and Counterterrorism, 71 La. L. Rev. 1147, 1153–54 (2011). As a result of this exposure of po-
lice brutality, the fundamental fairness concept of the Due Process Clause served as the 
Court’s basis for barring coerced confessions during the mid-1900s. Dickerson v. United 
States, 530 U.S. 428, 433–34 (2000); Guiora, supra, at 1154–55. During that time, the Court 
employed a voluntariness standard as the test of admitting confessions in approximately 
thirty cases. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 223 (1973) (stating that “between 
[Brown v. Mississippi and Escobedo v. Illinois] the Court was faced with the necessity of deter-
mining whether in fact the confessions in issue had been ‘voluntarily’ given”). The test 
sought to determine whether a defendant’s will was overborne and his “capacity for self-
determination critically impaired” in order to determine whether his confession offended 
due process, thus making the confession inadmissible. Id. at 225–26. The voluntariness stan-
dard proved tricky because it was subjective and ad hoc. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 
568, 604–05 (1961) (noting the amorphous nature of the voluntariness standard). It did not 
provide police forces with sufficient guidance for creating constitutional interrogation pro-
cedures because the standard was ambiguous. Richard L. Budden, Note, All in All, Miranda 
Loses Another Brick from Its Wall: The U.S. Supreme Court Swings Its Hammer in Berghuis v. 
Thompkins, Dealing a Crushing Blow to the Right to Remain Silent, 50 Washburn L.J. 483, 488 
(2011). The Court noted that the approximately thirty cases for which it applied the volun-
tariness standard “yielded no talismanic definition of ‘voluntariness.’” Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 
223–24. 
51 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457–58. 
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sures” of custodial interrogation.52 The Miranda Court required that, 
“[p]rior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a 
right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as 
evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an at-
torney, either retained or appointed.”53 
 The Miranda Court acknowledged, but ultimately eschewed, the 
opposing argument “that society’s need for interrogation outweigh[ed] 
the privilege,” holding instead that an individual’s constitutional right 
to not be compelled to be a witness against himself cannot be 
abridged.54 Moreover, the Court did not believe its decision constituted 
an undue interference with law enforcement practices because the po-
lice could still carry out traditional investigative functions.55 In impos-
ing Miranda warnings, the Court sought to balance the state’s interest 
in prosecuting criminals and the suspect’s Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination.56 
B. How Courts Determine Who Is “in Custody” 
 Miranda requires procedural protections whenever a suspect is 
questioned in “custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action 
in any significant way.”57 A custodial atmosphere is one that is police-
dominated and that isolates the suspect from the outside world.58 Sus-
pects who are physically and psychologically isolated by the police for 
interrogation are subjected to an inherently coercive atmosphere that 
could potentially lead them to confess to crimes they never commit-
ted.59 
 In order to determine whether a person is in custody for Miranda 
purposes, the court must first consider whether, given all of the circum-
stances surrounding the interrogation, a reasonable person would have 
felt restraint on his “freedom of movement of the degree associated 
with a formal arrest.”60 In order to determine whether a reasonable 
person would feel free to leave, courts consider, among other things, 
whether the location is familiar to the suspect, the duration of the in-
                                                                                                                      
52 Id. at 467. 
53 Id. at 444. 
54 Id. at 479. 
55 Id. at 481. 
56 Id. at 479–81. 
57 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. 
58 Id. at 445. 
59 Id. at 455 n.24, 467. 
60 Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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terrogation, whether the suspect was restrained in any manner, and 
whether the suspect was released at the end of the interrogation.61 The 
court must then assess these factors using a reasonable person standard 
to see whether the atmosphere is inherently coercive, like the type at 
play in the station house questioning in Miranda.62 
 In 1984, the Supreme Court held in Berkemer v. McCarty that a rou-
tine traffic stop does not require Miranda warnings because it is usually 
brief and in a public setting.63 The Court did note, however, that driv-
ers generally do not believe they can ignore an officer’s request to pull 
over or leave the scene without the officer’s express permission.64 Even 
still, the Court found that this situation does not “sufficiently impair [a 
person’s] exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to require 
that he be warned of his constitutional rights.”65 The Court reasoned 
that a traffic stop differs from a formal arrest because of its short 
length, usually lasting only a few minutes, and because motorists do not 
feel “completely at the mercy of the police.”66 
 Conversely, in 2011, in J.D.B. v. North Carolina, the Court held that 
the police’s interrogation of a child at her school was custodial despite 
the familiarity of the setting.67 The Court was concerned with the in-
creased risk that juveniles will succumb to the pressures of custodial 
interrogation, leading them to falsely confess or otherwise make state-
ments that “are not the product of [their] free choice.”68 
 Although location is an important consideration in the custody 
inquiry, it is not in itself determinative.69 For example, the defendant in 
Orozco v. Texas was deemed in custody when police officers questioned 
him in his bedroom at four a.m.70 The Court’s opinion turned on the 
fact that the defendant lacked freedom of movement because one of 
the officers said he was under arrest from the time the defendant said 
                                                                                                                      
61 Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 1189 (2012). 
62 See id. at 1189–90; Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 496 (1977) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting) (noting that defendant had an “objectively reasonable belief that he was not free 
to leave during the questioning”). 
63 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 436–39 (1984). 
64 Id. at 436. 
65 Id. at 437. 
66 Id. at 437–39. 
67 J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2401, 2408 (2011). 
68 Id. at 2401. 
69 See Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495 (holding that Miranda warnings are not required 
“simply because the questioning takes place in the station house”). 
70 Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 325–27 (1969). 
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his name.71 Thus, despite the fact that he was in a familiar setting, the 
defendant was in custody at the time of the questioning in his bed-
room.72 In contrast, in 1976, the Supreme Court held that the defen-
dant in Beckwith v. United States was not in custody when he was ques-
tioned by special agents of the Internal Revenue Service about his 
income taxes in a private home where he occasionally stayed.73 
 Additionally, a suspect who is interrogated at the police station is 
not necessarily in custody for Miranda purposes.74 While the Court in 
Miranda said that a suspect might be compelled to speak in the “isolated 
setting of the police station,” where a suspect comes to the police station 
voluntarily, his freedom to depart is not restricted and so he is not con-
sidered in custody for Miranda purposes.75 
C. Custody in Prisons Versus Custody for Miranda Purposes 
 The Supreme Court has decided four cases regarding the issue of 
whether prisoners must receive Miranda warnings when being interro-
gated at the prison.76 Each decision came down to the issue of whether 
or not the prisoner was in custody within the meaning prescribed by 
Miranda, as opposed to merely being in the custody of the prison.77 
The Court focused on the atmosphere during questioning to deter-
mine whether there was a risk of coercion necessitating Miranda warn-
ings.78 
 In 1968, in Mathis v. United States, the Court considered whether 
Robert T. Mathis, Sr., a prisoner at the Florida State Penitentiary, was 
entitled to Miranda warnings when an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
Agent isolated him from the general prison population and interro-
gated regarding an offense unconnected to the crime for which he was 
currently incarcerated.79 The IRS Agent asked Mathis questions regard-
ing his 1960 tax return and took his written consent to extend the stat-
                                                                                                                      
71 Id. at 325 (“[A]ccording to the testimony of one of the officers, petitioner was not 
free to go where he pleased . . . .”). 
72 Id. at 326. 
73 425 U.S. 341, 341–44 (1976). 
74 California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1121–22 (1983). 
75 Id.; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 461. 
76 See generally Howes, 132 S. Ct. 1181; Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010); Illi-
nois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 292 (1990); Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 2–5 (1968). 
77 See Howes, 132 S. Ct. at 1189–92; Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1224–25; Perkins, 496 U.S. at 
296; Mathis, 391 U.S. at 3–5. 
78 See Howes, 132 S. Ct. at 1189–92; Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1224–25; Perkins, 496 U.S. at 
296; Mathis, 391 U.S. at 3–5. 
79 Mathis, 391 U.S. at 2–3. 
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ute of limitations of this return.80 The IRS Agent returned less than a 
year later to interrogate Mathis regarding his 1961 returns.81 During 
these interrogations the IRS Agent neither gave Mathis his Miranda 
warnings, nor told him that he was under investigation for filing false 
income tax returns in 1960 and 1961.82 The Court found that Mathis 
was in custody for Miranda purposes, but did not explain its reason-
ing.83 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit subsequently at-
tempted to clarify the Supreme Court’s holding, saying that Mathis was 
in custody because he was isolated from the general prison popula-
tion.84 The Supreme Court then corrected the Sixth Circuit and stated 
a narrower holding: that a prisoner who otherwise deserves his Miranda 
warnings is not deprived of them if he is incarcerated for an uncon-
nected offense nor if a criminal investigation has not commenced.85 
 In 1990, in Illinois v. Perkins, the Court admitted a confession from 
inmate Lloyd Perkins regarding crimes unrelated to the crime for 
which he was incarcerated even though he had not been given his 
Miranda warnings.86 Perkins confessed to an undercover agent in his 
cell to a murder that occurred outside of the jail.87 The Court held that 
“[c]onversations between suspects and undercover agents do not impli-
cate the concerns underlying Miranda” because the coercive atmos-
phere is not present when the suspect believes he is simply confiding in 
a cellmate.88 The Court rejected the idea that Miranda warnings are 
required whenever a person technically in custody is speaking with a 
government agent.89 
 In 2010, in Maryland v. Shatzer, the Court articulated the difference 
between a prisoner being in the custody of a prison and being in 
Miranda custody.90 There, a detective interrogated inmate Michael 
Shatzer two separate times about a crime unrelated to the one for 
which he was currently serving time.91 The Court did not question that 
Shatzer was in custody during the interrogations as he was removed 
                                                                                                                      
80 Id. at 3 n.2. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 2–3. 
83 Id. at 3–5. 
84 Fields v. Howes, 617 F.3d 813, 818 (6th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 1181 (2012). 
85 Howes, 132 S. Ct. at 1188. 
86 Perkins, 496 U.S. at 294. 
87 Id. at 295. 
88 Id. at 296. 
89 Id. at 297. 
90 Id. at 1224–25. 
91 Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1217–18. 
228 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 33:217 
from his “normal life” to an isolated place for questioning.92 The 
Court, however, highlighted that Shatzer was not in custody for Miranda 
purposes during the period between the two interrogations because he 
was in the general prison population following his normal routine.93 
Moreover, the Court noted that the “inherently compelling pressures of 
custodial interrogation” were not present during the period between 
the interrogations because inmates at this facility could go to the li-
brary, take classes, and exercise.94 
 In its most recent decision on Miranda warnings in the prison con-
text, Howes v. Fields, decided in 2012, the Court held that there is no per 
se rule that a prisoner taken away from the general prison population 
to be interrogated about acts occurring outside the prison should re-
ceive Miranda warnings.95 Defendant Randall Lee Fields was convicted 
of committing sexual acts with a minor and sentenced to ten to fifteen 
years in prison.96 Relying on Miranda, Fields filed a motion with the 
state trial court to suppress the inculpatory statements he had made to 
deputies while being interrogated in the sheriff’s department of the 
jailhouse, but the motion was denied.97 The Supreme Court overruled 
the Sixth Circuit’s bright-line rule that whenever a prisoner is isolated 
from the general prison population for interrogation, he or she must 
receive Miranda warnings, instead stating that custody is dependent on 
all of the circumstances of the interrogation.98 
                                                                                                                      
92 Id. at 1224–25. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Howes, 132 S. Ct. at 1185. 
96 Id. at 1186. 
97 Id. Fields appealed the admission of his custodial statement, but the Michigan Court 
of Appeals affirmed the trial court holding that Fields had not been in custody for Miranda 
purposes. Id. The Michigan Supreme Court denied certiorari to Fields. Id. Fields filed a 
pro se petition to the Federal District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, arguing that the 
Michigan Court of Appeals unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent and the Dis-
trict Court, conditionally granting his habeas petition, found in Fields’s favor. See Antiter-
rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1996); Howes, 
132 S. Ct. at 1186–87. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found that the 
Michigan Court of Appeals made its decision in this case contrary to Supreme Court 
precedent as established in Mathis because the material facts in both cases were “indistin-
guishable.” Fields, 617 F.3d at 818–19. The Sixth Circuit found that Fields, like Mathis, was 
an inmate removed from the general prison population to be interrogated about an unre-
lated crime, and that Miranda warnings are required in those situations. Id. at 821–22. 
98 Howes, 132 S. Ct. at 1185, 1187 (refusing to “adopt any categorical rule with respect 
to whether the questioning of a prison inmate is custodial”). 
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II. Delving Deeper into Prison: Animals Living in a Cage 
 The concept of custody is especially problematic in the prison con-
text because courts must determine whether a prisoner, who is always in 
the custody of the prison, is also in custody for Miranda purposes dur-
ing an interrogation.99 In considering custody for Miranda purposes, 
courts consider the atmosphere of the interrogation to determine 
whether it amounts to a coercive atmosphere and would thus require 
Miranda warnings.100 The brutal atmosphere of prison negatively im-
pacts prisoners, and some argue that it produces more violence and 
crime.101 This Part will describe the inhumane atmosphere of prisons 
and illustrate its importance to the Miranda custody analysis for inter-
rogated prisoners.102 
A. What Is Prison? 
 Prisoners are stripped of their privacy and agency; they have no 
control over when they eat, sleep, shower, or when they can call some-
one on the outside.103 The conditions are degrading and the daily rou-
tine is a “constant reminder[] of their compromised social status and 
their stigmatized social role as prisoners.”104 
 Prison cells are small and extremely cramped: the typical cell size 
in maximum-security prisons is sixty-square-feet.105 In crowded prisons, 
which are becoming more common, two prisoners share this space, 
                                                                                                                      
99 Chokshi, supra note 31, at 22. 
100 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966). 
101 Zimbardo, supra note 33, at 206. 
102 See Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 1189–92 (2012) (analyzing the prison atmos-
phere to determine whether a prisoner is in custody for Miranda purposes); Zimbardo, 
supra note 33, at 206; Berg, supra note 37, at 475; Dominguez, supra note 37, at 1306, 1314–
16; Haney, supra note 32, at 38–43. 
103 Haney, supra note 32, at 45. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. Federal prisons are divided into five security levels, but this Note will focus pri-
marily on high security prisons. Prison Types & General Information, Federal Bureau of 
Prisons, http://www.bop.gov/locations/institutions/index.jsp (last visited Jan. 15, 2013). 
Minimum security institutions have limited or no perimeter fencing and are work- and 
program-oriented. Id. Low security Federal Correctional Institutions (FCIs) have double-
fenced perimeters, contain dormitory or cubicle housing, and place particular emphasis 
on work programs. Id. Medium security FCIs may have electronic detection systems on the 
double fences and more internal controls, contain cell-type housing, and have some work 
and treatment programs. Id. High security prisons or U.S. Penitentiaries (USPs) have tight 
controls on inmates, cell-type housing for single or multiple occupants, and highly secured 
perimeters of walls or reinforced fences. Id. 
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which is the size of a king-sized bed.106 Moreover, prisoners are re-
quired to live with few personal belongings.107 Everything they own 
must fit in one small locker.108 All of their possessions are subject to 
search, and guards often tear apart clothing, pillows, and any other 
items where contraband could be hidden.109 
 The food in prison is frequently foul; prisoners often complain 
about finding insects and pieces of rodents in their food.110 Moreover, 
the living conditions can be so unsanitary that prisoners contract dis-
eases, which can be deadly.111 Despite this fact, the prison health care 
system does not have the resources to meet the demands of the prison-
ers, and unless someone is near-death, he will not receive treatment.112 
 The overcrowding of prisons itself has received substantial media 
attention.113 The number of Americans in jail or prison has risen from 
approximately 360,000 to over 2.3 million people during the past thirty-
five years.114 The California state government is currently attempting to 
address its prison system’s severe overcrowding because the U.S. Su-
preme Court recently found that its overcrowded prisons violated the 
Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual punish-
ments.115 
 Furthermore, prisoners are placed in isolation, which some schol-
ars suggest allows them to reflect on their crimes.116 This isolation 
                                                                                                                      
106 Haney, supra note 32, at 35, 45. 
107 Santos, supra note 36, at 53. 
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110 Jeffrey Ian Ross, Resisting the Carceral State: Prisoner Resistance from the Bottom Up, 36 
Soc. Just. 28, 30 (2010). 
111 Id. Moreover, prisons often do not have air conditioning. Santos, supra note 36, at 
17. 
112 Ross, supra note 110, at 31; Garrett Bauer, Convicted of Insider Trading, Speech at 
Boston College Law School (Feb. 23, 2012). The prison health care system is so poor that 
many prisoners avoid exercise out of fear that they will be injured and unable to obtain 
treatment. Bauer, supra. 
113 See Alison Leigh Cowan & Christine Stuart, In Connecticut Prisons, a System Long on 
People, Short on Space, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 2007, at B1; Solomon Moore, The Prison Over-
crowding Fix, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 2009, at A17. 
114 Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 881, 886 (2009). Over 2.3 million Americans is more than one in one hundred 
Americans. Id. at 886–87. 
115 Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923 (2011); Jennifer Medina, California Begins Mov-
ing Prisoners, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 2011, at A14; see also Kyle T. Sullivan, Note, To Free or Not to 
Free: Rethinking Release Orders Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act After Brown v. Plata, 33 
B.C. J.L. & Soc. Just. (forthcoming Spring 2013) (detailing the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Brown v. Plata and urging penal reform to reduce prison overcrowding). 
116 Foucault, supra note 32, at 236–37. 
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“guarantees that it is possible to exercise over them, with maximum in-
tensity, a power that will not be overthrown by any other influence; soli-
tude is the primary condition of total submission . . . .”117 Often, pris-
oners are not allowed to meet with anyone in the public with whom 
they did not have a relationship with before entering prison.118 As one 
prisoner explains, “[t]his system of ‘corrections’ hinders my ability to 
build mentor relationships with law-abiding citizens who can help my 
transition to society.”119 
B. Understanding the Perspective and Role of the Corrections Officer 
 The role of the corrections officer is not to prepare prisoners to be 
proper citizens when they leave, but to ensure prison safety.120 Thus, 
despite what corrections facility literature purports, the primary focus 
of corrections officers’ duties is not to inspire prisoners to become law-
abiding citizens upon release.121 When corrections officers view incar-
cerated people as prisoners, not human beings, the institution fails to 
prepare prisoners to assimilate into civil society.122 Some guards de-
mean and degrade the prisoners, while others simply show no sympathy 
or compassion to them.123 Close interactions with prisoners are actually 
discouraged for fear that they could lead to friendships or relationships 
that would compromise security.124 Administrators rarely make use of 
positive reinforcement to incentivize good behavior.125 Rather, severe 
and immediate punishment is attached to every policy or rule because 
administrators fear the potentially disruptive, threatening prisoner.126 
                                                                                                                      
117 Id. at 237. 
118 Santos, supra note 36, at xxii. Prisoner Michael Santos was not allowed to meet 
with the head of the Criminology Department at an American college because they did not 
have a previously established relationship. Id. 
119 Id. at xxii–xxiii. 
120 Id. at xxi. 
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123 Zimbardo, supra note 33, at 207. The findings from Professor Philip Zimbardo’s 
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Many prisons have a zero tolerance policy in which the punishment is 
often disproportionate to the actual crime.127 
 Prison employees may seem coldhearted at first blush, but they, 
too, have been hardened by the prison culture.128 Their actions are of-
ten influenced by the amount of violence they see on a daily basis.129 
Moreover, they are influenced by society’s portrayal of prisoners as “the 
other” who are “fundamental threat[s] to our cherished values and be-
liefs.”130 This perception leads the guards to treat prisoners in a dehu-
manizing way.131 Once the prisoner is labeled this way, “human beings 
are capable of totally abandoning their humanity for a mindless ideol-
ogy, to follow and then exceed the orders of charismatic authorities to 
destroy everyone they label as ‘The Enemy.’”132 The guards’ ability to 
selectively engage and disengage their moral standards allows them to 
be “barbarically cruel in one moment and compassionate in the 
next.”133 It is the circumstances of the prison that lead guards to con-
trol in ways that they may not otherwise find morally acceptable.134 As 
one prisoner explained, “The very nature of their job requires the offi-
cers to treat all prisoners as inanimate objects rather than fellow human 
beings. Their primary concern is security.”135 The same prisoner said: 
With thousands of prisoners to manage, guards in large penal 
facilities consider prisoners the way fishermen consider the 
thousands of fish they haul in with a good netting. The job 
description requires the guards to treat each prisoner the 
same, so they make no effort to consider the individual. No 
                                                                                                                      
127 See id. Of his tenure as a prisoner at Pelican Bay State Prison, Michael Santos ob-
serves: 
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classifications separate rapacious predators from obvious prey. 
Everyone survives—or not—in the same pool.136 
 The guards are “deindividuated” because their uniforms give them 
a common identity, which in turn changes their mental functioning.137 
That is, the guards’ feeling of personal accountability is reduced be-
cause they perform their roles in uniforms.138 This deindividuation 
breeds violence and evil because the guards “live in an expanded-
present moment that makes past and future distant and irrelevant.”139 
Guards engage in “cognitive dissonance” to rationalize their evil acts, by 
playing a public role in a way that may differ from their personal be-
liefs.140 
 There are many examples of prison staff disrespecting prisoners 
without a second thought.141 Prison officials become dismissive of pris-
oners and tend to see them as members of a lower social class.142 This 
power leads them to do unconscionable acts.143 For example, guards 
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137 See Zimbardo, supra note 33, at 219. 
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143 James Forman, Jr., Education for Liberation, 2 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 75, 75–76 
(2008) (describing how guards choked, kneed, and punched a new youth offender after 
he ran out of breath during a forced run at a detention facility). For example, prisoner 
Michael Santos was forced to take off his wedding ring and when he questioned the officer 
regarding a policy authorizing him to keep it on, the guard responded: “‘I don’t give a 
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running it.’” Santos, supra note 36, at xxvi. The officer stood before Michael, who feared 
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may abuse their power during strip searches, when prison policy re-
quires that the guards search the crotch and genital areas of prison-
ers.144 While the underlying safety concerns of strip searches are under-
standable, there is evidence that the searches also are intended to 
humiliate new inmates who are searched at booking.145 Most guards try 
not to degrade the prisoners by conducting such thorough searches or 
watching them undress, but some engage in more invasive searches and 
purposefully watch prisoners undress in order to intimidate the prison-
ers.146 Some guards who feel discomfort with the searches often engage 
in more intrusive behavior in order to fit in with their colleagues.147 
C. Understanding the Circumstances of the Prisoner 
 The poor treatment of prisoners leads to forms of resistance and 
adaptation.148 Prison is a brutal place that invokes the worst in human 
nature.149 Most researchers agree that living in a prison causes psycho-
logical harm, which leads to negative, long-term change in prisoners.150 
“Prisonization” and “institutionalization” are terms psychologists use to 
describe the negative psychological effects of imprisonment.151 One 
prisoner describes the effects in this way: 
I hadn’t yet grown used to my new status as a federal prisoner. 
The worst part, for me, was neither the chains nor the crip-
pling restrictions on my movement. It was fighting the de-
mons tormenting my mind about what my future held, that 
and having to live in the constant company of other prisoners, 
other people in chains whose history I didn’t know and whose 
behavior I could not predict.152 
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 Prisons are dehumanizing for prisoners because they are stripped 
of their freedom and privacy until they lose their personal identities.153 
Prisoners are separated from “their past, their community, and their 
families” and become anonymous people whose behavior is dictated by 
guards.154 They are forced to abandon their self-reliance and relinquish 
the freedom they had to make their own choices and decisions.155 
Moreover, officers are trained to call prisoners by their number, rather 
than their names, and told not to touch them so that the officers retain 
the power and to remind the prisoners they are a “lower class.”156 
 Prisoners have a dim outlook on life because they are trained to 
believe that they will become nothing more than a prisoner in life.157 So 
they plan for the next few hours, not life after prison.158 A prisoner does 
not thrive in the prison system by being meritorious; rather it is his 
reputation that matters, which is enhanced by inciting violence.159 Thus, 
prisoners have a different value system and they rise to the top by being 
uncooperative and unremorseful.160 The prisoner who does not express 
guilt or cooperate with law enforcement authorities is most noble.161 
 Prisoners often turn against each other because they do not feel 
part of a supportive community.162 The conditions make them feel 
anonymous, which lead to “anti-social, self-interested behaviors.”163 They 
hide their feelings from others, and sometimes “forget that they have 
any feelings at all,” in order to protect themselves from exploitation by 
the other prisoners.164 They are then disinclined from building relation-
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ships with other inmates and some withdraw from socializing alto-
gether.165 
 Prisoners may internalize the oppressiveness of the setting and 
turn against their fellow prisoners by watching them be humiliated by 
the guards.166 This is called “identification with the aggressor.”167 This 
occurred in Nazi concentration camps, where “prisoners internalized 
the power that was inherent in their oppressors.”168 When the prisoner 
deludes himself in this way, he cannot realistically assess his situation 
and so he rebels against his fellow inmates.169 
 It is evident that prisons are dangerous, and thus, prisoners must 
always be on the lookout for threats.170 They are forced to be defensive 
and to avoid looking weak or inattentive.171 If a prisoner does not seem 
prepared for violence, other inmates will exploit him.172 Many male 
prisoners do not leave their cells without a weapon, and thus have 
found discrete ways to conceal their weapons.173 Concealed weapons 
are preferred to larger ones, such as steel pipes, because they are less 
likely to be found by guards.174 Many prisoners join gangs or cliques to 
protect themselves from attack.175 One prisoner said, “[e]very prisoner 
in the penitentiary breathes only whispers away from extortion at-
tempts, from savage gang rapes, from bludgeoning and stabbings.”176 
Another prisoner described this taut atmosphere by saying, “[t]hey are 
insects in a tank full of hungry lizards.”177 
 It helps if prisoners enters with connections or street-tough credi-
bility.178 Every week, new prisoners enter the system, and “some pass[,] 
[s]ome do not.”179 As such, gangs are also a way for prisoners to create a 
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community and make a life for themselves inside the penitentiary.180 
Gang leaders control the community, have connections with the guards, 
and are in charge of distributing food, alcohol, steroids, muscle-building 
supplements, sneakers, and sexual favors among the prisoners.181 
 For many prisoners, the biggest fear is prison rape.182 When pris-
oners enter the penitentiary for the first time, it is not uncommon for 
them to hear “catcalls.”183 Those who become victims of sexual abuse 
sometimes believe their own death, or someone else’s, would be more 
tolerable.184 
III. Howes v. Fields: A Missed Opportunity 
 The Supreme Court’s finding in Howes v. Fields that Fields was not 
in Miranda custody when he was interrogated is inconsistent with its 
past decisions on Miranda custody in the prison context.185 Moreover, 
when analyzing whether the interrogated prisoner should have re-
ceived Miranda warnings in Howes, the Court minimized the harsh re-
alities of the prison atmosphere.186 Instead, it should have considered 
with greater nuance the psychological pressures that prisoners are un-
der because it affects the circumstances of the interrogation.187 
A. Howes v. Fields Is Inconsistent with Past Supreme Court Cases 
 The Supreme Court recently had an opportunity to closely exam-
ine the prison atmosphere with its discussion of whether a prisoner 
must receive Miranda warnings before being interrogated.188 The issue 
before the Court was whether its earlier cases created clearly estab-
lished law “that the questioning of a prisoner is always custodial when 
the prisoner is removed from the general prison population and ques-
tioned about events that occurred outside the prison.”189 In reversing 
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the Sixth Circuit’s decision, the Court held that its previous decisions 
did not clearly establish this categorical rule.190 
 The Court was correct not to find a per se rule given its previous 
holdings.191 In Illinois v. Perkins, the Court stated “[t]he bare fact of cus-
tody may not in every instance require a warning even when the sus-
pect is aware that he is speaking to an official . . . .”192 In Maryland v. 
Shatzer, the Court explicitly declined to adopt a per se rule, stating that 
Miranda custody in the prison context would “depend upon whether 
[incarceration] exerts the coercive pressure that Miranda was designed 
to guard against—the ‘danger of coercion [that] results from the inter-
action of custody and official interrogation.’”193 Moreover, the Court 
said the Sixth Circuit was wrong to rely on Mathis v. United States be-
cause the Mathis Court did not find that imprisonment alone requires 
Miranda warnings.194 
 Although the Court was correct not to find a per se rule, the rest 
of its decision in Howes is inconsistent with its past decisions on Miranda 
custody in the prison context.195 Given the Court’s past decisions, it 
should have found that Fields was entitled to Miranda warnings because 
he was interrogated for five to seven hours in an unfamiliar setting by 
enforcement officers away from the prison population.196 
 The circumstances of Fields’s interrogation are unlike that of the 
suspect in Perkins where the Court admitted the confession into evi-
dence even though he had not received his Miranda warnings.197 The 
suspect in Perkins confessed to undercover agents in his cell, which the 
Court held did not amount to the coercive atmosphere Miranda sought 
to remedy because he thought he was speaking to fellow inmates.198 By 
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contrast, Fields was isolated from his fellow inmates against his will, and 
rather than being questioned in his cell by people whom he thought 
were his cellmates, he was questioned by law enforcement officers in a 
conference room where he had never been before.199 These differ-
ences should have led the Court to hold that “his ‘freedom of action 
[was] curtailed in [a] significant way.’”200 Unlike the suspect in Perkins, 
Fields was in a coercive environment and so he should have received 
Miranda warnings.201 
 The circumstances of Fields’s interrogation are similar to that of 
the suspects in Mathis and Shatzer, who were found to be in custody for 
Miranda purposes.202 In both instances the suspects were isolated from 
the general prison population and interrogated for offenses uncon-
nected to the crime for which they were imprisoned.203 Fields was simi-
larly isolated from the general prison population and questioned about 
an unconnected offense, which supports a finding that he was in cus-
tody.204 
 Considerations such as the setting of the interrogation, including 
whether it occurred in a familiar place where the suspect felt comfort-
able, have also proved important for the Miranda custody analysis.205 
For example, the Court has determined that police questioning of a 
child at his school could be a custodial interrogation.206 Additionally, 
interrogating a suspect in his bedroom at four a.m. where he was not 
allowed to leave was deemed to be a custodial interrogation requiring 
Miranda warnings.207 In both of these cases, the suspects were in famil-
iar settings—one’s school and the other’s bedroom—and yet the Court 
found their freedom of movement was restricted and therefore they 
were considered to be in custody for Miranda purposes.208 Unlike the 
above cases, Fields was not in a familiar setting because he was in a part 
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of the jail that he had never been before and he did not know how to 
get back to his cell.209 Thus, the location of Fields’s interrogation does 
not tame the inherently coercive aspects of police interrogation as the 
Supreme Court found; rather it suggests that he was in custody.210 
 The length of the interrogation and whether the suspect was 
“completely at the mercy of the police” are also important considera-
tions in determining whether the “suspect’s freedom of action [wa]s 
curtailed to a ‘degree associated with formal arrest.’”211 Fields was at the 
mercy of the police because he did not feel he had freedom to leave the 
interrogation.212 In her dissenting opinion in Howes, Justice Ginsburg 
disagreed with the majority that a reasonable person in Fields’s situation 
“would have felt free to terminate the interview and leave” given these 
facts.213 She concluded that Fields was in a custodial interrogation be-
cause he had not volunteered to do the interview with the armed depu-
ties that lasted long into the night, nor was he told that he had the right 
to decline the interrogation.214 Although Fields told the deputies multi-
ple times that he wanted to end the interrogation, the questioning con-
tinued.215 Justice Ginsburg argued that Fields’s freedom of movement 
was significantly curtailed because he “was subjected to ‘incommunicado 
interrogation . . . in a police-dominated atmosphere,’” and he “was 
placed, against his will, in an inherently stressful situation.”216 
B. The Court in Howes v. Fields Minimized the Negative Effects of Prisons in 
Its Miranda Custody Analysis 
 In analyzing whether Fields was in custody during the interroga-
tion for Miranda purposes, the Court did not adequately consider the 
negative effects of the prison atmosphere.217 Instead, the Court mini-
mized the effects of the prison atmosphere by analyzing three elements 
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of the Sixth Circuit’s per se rule: (1) the fact that the suspect is in 
prison; (2) that the interrogation took place outside of the general 
prison population; and (3) that it was about events occurring outside of 
the prison.218 
 First, the Court said “imprisonment alone is not enough to create 
a custodial situation within the meaning of Miranda.”219 The Court rea-
soned that the interrogation process is not as shocking for a prisoner as 
it is for someone taken from his home to be questioned.220 As such, a 
prisoner is used to having his freedom restricted and thus does not en-
counter the same “inherently compelling pressures” and shock that a 
free person would during an interrogation.221 Therefore, the Court 
reasoned that a prisoner feels no pressure to confess in order to end 
the interrogation because a prisoner knows he will not be released at 
the end of the questioning, but will remain incarcerated.222 According 
to the Court, a prisoner’s familiarity with the legal system ensures 
awareness that the officers interrogating him have no power to reduce 
his current sentence; however, an ordinary person might overestimate 
the power of the interrogating officer and confess in an effort to obtain 
more lenient treatment.223 
 Second, the Court found that isolating a prisoner from the general 
prison population is in his best interest.224 A prisoner, the Court rea-
soned, is not taken from the supportive environment comprised of his 
family and friends.225 Rather, he is taken away from a population that 
may be hostile and may react negatively to the interrogation process.226 
The Court acknowledged that removing the prisoner from the general 
population may further restrain the prisoner because of the additional 
safeguards that must be put in place, but the Court felt that prisoners 
become accustomed to such restraints. 227 
 Third, the Court found that the questioning of the prisoner about 
crimes occurring outside of the prison was no more likely to be coer-
cive than questioning about crimes occurring inside the prison because 
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either could lead to criminal punishment.228 Thus, because prisoners 
are familiar with the legal system, the isolated interrogation is consid-
ered to be in their best interest, and because the questioning about 
crimes occurring outside of prison is not more likely to be coercive, the 
Court did not uphold the Sixth Circuit’s per se rule.229 
 While the Court in Howes did consider the conditions of the 
prison, it wrongly minimized the negative effects of the atmosphere on 
the prisoner.230 The Court should not have minimized the violent and 
dehumanizing atmosphere of the prison because its psychological ef-
fects do not cease when the prisoner enters the interrogation room.231 
Rather than grasping the negative effects of the prison atmosphere, the 
Court reasoned that Fields, like all prisoners, is more comfortable in an 
interrogation atmosphere than a non-prisoner would be.232 Yet Fields’s 
yelling and agitation during the interrogation demonstrates that the 
law enforcement interrogators did not “quell the psychological and tac-
tical pressures inherent in the course” of interrogation to ensure a vol-
untary confession.233 The Court also found that isolating a prisoner 
from the general prison population is in his best interest because, 
unlike a free person, the prisoner is not taken from a supportive, com-
fortable environment for the interrogation.234 In this way, the Court 
minimized the fact that prisoners have already been taken away from 
their family and friends, and used the fact instead to prove that inter-
rogations in prisons are not coercive because prisoners have grown ac-
customed to their isolated situation.235 While it is true that many pris-
oners do not feel like they are members of a supportive community, the 
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Court should not ignore that incarceration causes long-term psycho-
logical harm to prisoners.236 
IV. Future Courts Should Account for the Negative Effects 
of Prison in Their Miranda Custody Analysis 
 The Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona sought to end destructive 
police tactics and stressed the importance of protecting an interrogated 
suspect’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, stating: 
The current practice of incommunicado interrogation is at 
odds with one of our Nation’s most cherished principles— 
that the individual may not be compelled to incriminate him-
self. Unless adequate protective devices are employed to dis-
pel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no 
statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the 
product of his free choice.237 
The fears of the Miranda Court are resurfacing almost a half-century 
later in the context of prison interrogations because prisons often pre-
sent the coercive atmosphere that the Court attempted to prevent in 
1966.238 Prisons present this risk because of their isolating, degrading 
conditions.239 Prisons dehumanize inmates by depriving them of their 
freedom and privacy.240 Moreover, prison guards exercise pitiless power 
over prisoners because they have been hardened by prison culture.241 
 The Supreme Court has significantly narrowed the scope of 
Miranda’s protections since it was decided in 1966.242 In 2012, in Howes 
v. Fields, the Court further narrowed Miranda’s protections by finding 
that prisoners are not entitled to Miranda warnings so long as the po-
lice simply tell them that they are free to terminate the interrogation 
and return to their cells.243 The decision in Howes hampers Miranda’s 
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efforts to protect suspects from the compelling atmosphere of interro-
gation and to ensure that confessions are made voluntarily.244 
 While the Court was correct not to find a per se rule, the Howes 
Court should have given more weight to the fact that the negative psy-
chological effects of incarceration remain with prisoners when they are 
taken outside of the general prison population for interrogation.245 In 
the future, lower courts should follow the Court’s established Miranda 
test by looking at all of the circumstances of the interrogation, but, in 
doing so, they should utilize a better understanding of the negative ef-
fects of prisons on prisoners.246 After all, the objective test is from the 
perspective of a reasonable person in the circumstances.247 Therefore, 
courts should consider whether a reasonable prisoner, given the cir-
cumstances, would have felt free to leave.248 
 Accordingly, when confronted with the question of whether a sus-
pect in prison is in custody for Miranda purposes, future courts should 
consider factors that account for the coercive atmosphere prisoners 
face and the physical and psychological power prison guards exert over 
prisoners.249 Specifically, courts should consider factors such as: the 
language used to summon a prisoner from his cell and whether he was 
given the opportunity to deny speaking with officers at the outset; 
whether the prisoner was told he could leave once the interrogation 
began; whether the officers withheld necessities such as food, water, 
bathroom breaks, or medications; whether the prisoner was physically 
restrained; whether the officers were armed; whether the interrogation 
took place in a familiar place where the suspect felt comfortable; and 
the length of the interrogation.250 By examining the above factors for 
signs of coercion, future courts can ensure that any statement obtained 
from a prisoner is freely given.251  
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 In analyzing Fields’s interrogation in Howes, the Court went 
through the motions of examining the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the interrogation; however, it failed to acknowledge the 
clear signs indicating that Fields did not feel free to leave.252 The Court 
recognized the length of Fields’s interrogation and the fact that the 
deputies were armed and spoke with a sharp tones indicated a custodial 
atmosphere.253 The Court ultimately, however, found these factors were 
outweighed by the facts that Fields was not physically restrained, that he 
was told he could leave, that the room was well-lit, and that the door to 
the interrogation room was sometimes open.254 
 The Howes Court emphasized that Fields was told he could leave at 
any time, but Fields said he was well aware that he could not freely 
leave.255 This is likely because of the controls he grew accustomed to in 
prison, where he gave up all of his freedoms.256 Upon incarceration, 
prisoners are forced to abandon their self-reliance and relinquish their 
freedom, and this mindset does not simply disappear when prisoners 
enter the interrogation room.257 Prisoners know they cannot move 
about freely; instead they are trained to be complicit in officer’s re-
quests at the risk of severe and immediate punishment.258 
 Further, the Howes Court did not adequately grasp Fields’s percep-
tion of the armed sheriffs’ power over him; he felt intimidated by them, 
likely because armed prison guards tend to treat prisoners like inani-
mate objects.259 Fields was not asked whether he wished to speak with 
the officers; instead he was taken from his cell to a conference room in 
the guard’s quarters of the jail.260 Questioning that occurs in the 
guard’s quarters—a place where a reasonable prisoner would not feel 
comfortable—is inherently more coercive than questioning done in a 
place more familiar to a prisoner such as a visiting or interview 
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room.261 Fields was beholden to the guards because he was taken to a 
part of the jail that he was not familiar with and, without their help, he 
did not know how to get back to his cell.262 Furthermore, despite tell-
ing the officers multiple times that “he did not want to speak with them 
anymore,” he was questioned into the early morning.263 For these rea-
sons, it is important that prisoners are not merely told by officers that 
they are free to leave, but that the officers’ actions and the circum-
stances during the interrogation demonstrate to the prisoner that he is 
at liberty to end the interrogation and return to his cell.264 
 Even though Howes did not adequately address the brutalizing at-
mosphere of prisons, lower courts have the ability to do so without vio-
lating Howes because the Supreme Court in Howes gave the lower courts 
flexibility by not finding a per se rule and instead outlining the objective 
all-of-the-circumstances test.265 The Howes Court stated that “[w]hen a 
prisoner is questioned, the determination of custody should focus on all 
of the features of the interrogation” and that a prisoner who is found to 
be in Miranda custody will be entitled to Miranda protections.266 This 
objective test allows the courts to incorporate the negative psychological 
effects of prisons into their custody analysis, which will protect interro-
gated prisoners from the pressures the Miranda Court feared.267 By cou-
pling the wretchedness that comes with being a prisoner and the coer-
cive characteristics of prison interrogations, courts should find that 
interrogated prisoners are usually entitled to Miranda warnings.268 
 While the Court in Howes stated that the Miranda analysis should 
focus on the features of the interrogation, it is important to recognize 
that prisoners are influenced by what they learn outside of the interro-
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gation.269 The prison environment negatively affects prisoners such that 
they may feel coerced during interrogations and therefore need to be 
advised of their Miranda rights.270 The fact that the cruel and inhumane 
prison environment seeps into the interrogation room is a factor that 
should be acknowledged when analyzing whether a given interrogation 
amounts to the coercion feared by the Miranda Court.271 By incorporat-
ing a better understanding of the negative psychological aspects of pris-
ons into the Miranda totality analysis, prisoners will be given some pro-
tection from the coercive interrogations that Miranda sought to avoid.272 
Conclusion 
 The concept of custodial interrogation is especially difficult in the 
prison context because prisoners are always in the custody of the 
prison. But, in order to be deemed in custody for Miranda purposes, 
courts look at whether one’s freedom of movement was deprived in any 
significant way. Courts consider all of the circumstances of the interro-
gation to determine whether a reasonable person would have felt re-
straint on his freedom of movement similar to an arrest. This allows 
courts to determine whether the situation amounts to the inherently 
coercive atmosphere that the Supreme Court was trying to prevent with 
Miranda. Nevertheless, when given the chance in Howes v. Fields, the 
Supreme Court did not adequately consider the negative psychological 
and sociological effects that incarceration has on prisoners in its 
Miranda custody analysis. Moreover, the Court’s decision was inconsis-
tent with its past decisions applying the Miranda custody analysis in the 
prison context. It is important for courts to consider the wretchedness 
of prison life, as described in this Note, in order to protect prisoners’ 
Miranda privileges in the future. Specifically, courts need to consider 
what life is like in prison and the negative effects of the atmosphere on 
prisoners in order to better assess if the inherently compelling pres-
sures of custodial interrogation exist. 
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